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COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE: 
RETURNING AUTHOR PROTECTIONS TO 
THEIR RATIONAL ROOTS 
Robert E. Shepard 
          Copyright protections encourage the production of intellectual 
property by temporarily restricting free public access, a constitutional 
design that Justice Stephen Breyer has called a “two-edged sword.” 
Yet, the Copyright Clause really enshrines a triangular relationship 
among authors, consumers, and commodifiers, a third constituency that 
has always interposed itself between author-creators and consumer 
end-users.  
          Though the Copyright Triangle is nothing new, a fundamental 
reordering of these constituencies is in progress, with digital 
commodifiers such as Google assuming a dominant role. Though they 
sometimes proclaim themselves champions of free public access to 
culture, these commodifiers have instead aggrandized themselves at the 
expense of intellectual property creators and, ultimately, consumers, 
damaging the Copyright Clause’s delicate balance of private 
incentives. 
          This Note demonstrates how copyright law increasingly serves 
the interests of a limited subset of commodifiers at the expense of 
authors and the public. It shows how two recent Supreme Court 
decisions that ostensibly benefited authors, Eldred v. Ashcroft and 
Golan v. Holder, instead exacerbated this trend. The Note advocates 
two fundamental changes to copyright laws that may help protect 
authors’ rights in the expanding digital universe, and also protect the 
public’s right to gain timely, free access to intellectual property. First, 
Congress should allow authors to more rapidly reclaim the rights they 
grant to third parties, such as publishers. Second, Congress should 
dramatically reduce copyright durations for certain kinds of intellectual 
property, including books, injecting these works into the public domain 
more rapidly. These changes may not only bring equilibrium to the 
three sides of the Copyright Triangle but also restore the grand bargain 
enshrined in the Copyright Clause.  
 
  J.D. May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.A. and B.A., University of 
Pennsylvania.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution confers 
upon Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 A 
close reading of the Clause suggests that it is a grand bargain seeking 
to balance the interests of two parties: authors and inventors, on the 
one hand, and the public on the other.2 The Clause’s genius is that it 
establishes incentives for the creators of intellectual property, by 
allowing them exclusive control over their works for a period of 
time.3 At the same time, however, it provides a windfall of art, 
science, and information to the public.4 
Justice Stephen Breyer has observed that this dualistic structure 
confers a “monopoly” on authors and is therefore a “two-edged 
sword.”5 That is, while “encourag[ing] production of new works” by 
deterring uncompensated copying, copyright also “tends to restrict 
the dissemination (and use) of works once produced.”6 Copyright can 
accomplish this effect either by driving retail prices upward or by 
imposing additional “administrative costs” on users who want to 
“find [a work’s] owner and strike a bargain.”7 
Justice Breyer’s observation ignores a third set of parties: the 
commodifiers of intellectual property who have always interposed 
themselves between creators and consumer end-users. Over the long 
history of the printed word, these have included printers, typesetters, 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Although the Clause speaks equally to the interests of authors and inventors, this Note is 
concerned mainly with the rights of authors—especially authors of written works, and more 
especially authors of books. 
 3. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (characterizing the Clause's 
"economic philosophy" as "the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors"). 
 4. Id. The Mazer Court went on to say: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities 
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." This oft-cited decision is 
remembered in part for its holding that statuettes of dancing figures, used as bases for table 
lamps, were protectable under copyright as “art.”  
 5. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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book publishers, wholesalers, and retail booksellers.8 But more 
recently, this stratum of commodifiers—whose work is tied to the 
mechanical reproduction and retail sale of books and other printed 
and manufactured goods—has begun to give way to a new set of 
digital publishers and information aggregators.9 These include search 
engine providers, such as Google, that permit users to search the 
complete texts of book-length works, viewing many pages at a time 
without charge.10 Online retailers of books that are published in 
digital media rather than printed and bound, such as Amazon and its 
Kindle “ebooks,” have become significant players as well.11 
With digitization has come a speeding of the time and a 
streamlining of the mechanisms employed to get works from their 
authors, photographers, composers, artists, and designers to the 
ultimate end-user.12 Traditional commodifiers, such as book 
publishers, still interpose themselves between authors and 
consumers, but they must now share this increasingly crowded space 
with newer entities that arose online.13 Moreover, book and “ebook” 
retailers such as Amazon have begun to found their own publishing 
divisions, thereby signaling a consolidation of both the editing and 
digital and print manufacturing of books with the retailing business.14 
Thus, Justice Breyer’s two-edged sword is better characterized 
as a triangle: a three-way relationship among authors, consumers, 
and commodifiers. This “Copyright Triangle” is nothing new. It had 
its origins at least as early as Elizabethan England and gave rise to 
 
 8. For a useful overview of the evolution of the “commodifier” side of the Triangle from 
early printers to booksellers to modern print and digital publishers, see Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in A Digital Age, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1121 (2003). 
 9. See generally Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (discussing Google’s efforts to digitize 12 million books to make available for online 
searching without seeking copyright permission). 
 10. Id. Google has scanned more than 12 million books, of which millions were still under 
copyright, and made them searchable online. Id. 
 11. PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, REVEALING THE BUSINESS OF EBOOKS: THE FOURTH ANNUAL 
EBOOK SURVEY OF PUBLISHERS, APTARA CORP. (2012), http://ww3.aptaracorp.com/lp 
/landingpages/4thebooksurveyregister.html (follow “Download the Survey Results & Analysis” 
and complete registration form for free download). 
 12. See Julie Bosman, Writer’s Cramp: In the e-Reader Era, a Book a Year is Slacking, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/in-e-reader-age-of-
writers-cramp-a-book-a-year-is-slacking.html. 
 13. See Steve Wasserman, The Amazon Effect, THE NATION, May 29, 2012, http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/168125/amazon-effect#. 
 14. Id. 
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the very tensions among authors, printer–booksellers, and consumers 
that resulted in the foundational document in Anglo−American 
copyright law, the Statute of Anne (1710), which gave authors—and 
not exclusively printer–booksellers—the right to copy their own 
written works.15 The Statute is the direct antecedent of our 
constitutional copyright protections and the federal copyright statutes 
that have interpreted and expanded those protections for more than 
two centuries.16 
What is new, as this Note will argue, is a fundamental 
reordering of the traditional roles these three parties—authors, 
consumers, and commodifiers—have occupied along the sides of the 
Triangle. At different times in copyright history, authors (by 
asserting restrictions on the use and reuse of their work), consumers 
(by asserting their right of access to knowledge and art) and 
commodifiers (by asserting their critical role in moving intellectual 
property from authors to consumers) have each been in the 
ascendancy.17 Thus the Triangle is not always equilateral; it has often 
been isosceles, with two sides of equal length and one side 
disproportionately shorter. And in recent years—first as traditional 
commodifiers asserted more and more authority at authors’ expense, 
and then as these traditional entities began ceding ground to the new 
class of digital commodifiers—authors have moved definitively to 
the short side of the Triangle. 
By facilitating the movement of intellectual property to 
consumers at little to no cost without any apparent concern for 
authors’ copyright protections, the new commodifiers have 
challenged structures that helped compensate authors, however 
imperfectly, or their creative works.18 Their arrival has also triggered 
 
 15. See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 41–42 (2004). 
 16. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). For a more complete summary of the 
Statute’s passage and its relation to the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution, see Golan v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900–01 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 17. See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 501 (1991) (tracing, among other trends, continual shifts in 
the idea and meaning of “authorship” since the period of the Statute of Anne, the relation of 
authorship to the commodification of works, and the “remarkably congruent” interests of 
consumers and copyright owners). 
 18. See Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 11, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), 2011 WL 5905500. The plaintiffs, a 
membership organization of authors and a representative class of individual authors, asserted that 
Google’s alleged unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works damaged authors through, inter 
COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE  10/19/2014 10:51 AM 
736 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:731 
a new alliance between commodifiers and consumer end-users.19 
Authors are aware of the ongoing weakening of their control over the 
fruits of their labors yet continue to give ground.20 Copyright law 
must be especially protective of authors’ rights at such a time, yet, as 
this Note will show, it has instead been mainly protective of 
commodifiers, whose interests increasingly diverge from those of 
authors. Thus, it is important to explore what has upset the balance in 
the Copyright Triangle, and how it can be restored. 
Part II examines the two most prominent recent Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with copyright, specifically copyright duration: 
Eldred v. Ashcroft21 and Golan v. Holder.22 The Court presented 
these decisions, which confirmed the durational extensions embodied 
in the most recent revision of the Copyright Act, as benefiting 
authors; however, their real effect, as Part III shows, was to 
strengthen the position of certain intellectual property commodifiers, 
notably movie studios, with little regard to the effects on authors. At 
the same time, the expansion of the new class of digital 
commodifiers further eroded the ability of authors to police the 
integrity of their own copyrights, while making copyrighted material 
 
alia, “depreciation in the value and ability to license and sell their Books,” lost profits, and 
“damage to their goodwill and reputation.” Id. 
 19. See Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital 
Revolution for Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2438, 2451 (2001) (differentiating the “institutional 
distribution regime” from digital distribution methods and asserting that “scholars and lawmakers 
alike have failed to address the root of the problem, which is not that technology empowers the 
public to flout copyright law with impunity, but instead that the public has no aversion to seizing 
this opportunity”). 
20. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the most 
recent case to erode author protections. In HathiTrust, the court upheld, largely on grounds that 
the “fair use” defense was available to the defendants, the mass-scanning into digital form of 
millions of books held by university libraries, without provision for royalty payments to the 
authors of those works that were under copyright. Id. at 464. HathiTrust’s effects and meaning 
will be discussed in Part III infra. See also Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 135 
(2d Cir. 2013) (vacating the district court’s earlier class certification for a group of authors, 
publishers, and other copyright holders and remanding for a determination of whether the 
database company could assert a valid fair-use defense to mass copyright infringement). The 
court noted that Google’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to represent the certified class “may 
carry some force.” Id. at 134. James Grimmelman observed that “[i]f the case ever does manage 
to reach the fair use merits, Google is now that likelier to get the same kind of sweeping fair-use 
blessing that its library partners got in the HathiTrust decision.” James Grimmelman, Second 
Circuit Decertifies the Google Books Class, THE LABORATORIUM (July 1, 2013, 11:30 AM), 
http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/07/01/second_circuit_decertifies_the_google_books_class. 
 21. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 22. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
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available to consumers at little or no cost.23 Thus, as Part III 
concludes, one fundamental goal of the Copyright Clause—
protecting authors so they could be encouraged to generate more 
works to benefit society—was left unserved. Part IV concludes by 
advocating two fundamental changes to copyright law that may help 
protect authors’ rights in the newly expanding digital universe. 
First, Congress should revise the most recent version of the 
Copyright Act to allow authors to more quickly reclaim rights they 
have temporarily granted to third parties, such as book publishers, 
during the term of copyright. Second, Congress should reduce 
copyright durations for certain kinds of works, including books—the 
opposite of the inflationary trend that has resulted in a continuous 
expansion of copyright durations since 1831. Reducing copyright 
duration may seem counterintuitive as a means of protecting author 
rights, yet may help restore a more traditional balance that has been 
altered by the aggrandizement of commodifiers. Each of these 
proposed policy changes points to one further philosophical 
imperative: dispensing with the idea that all forms of copyrighted 
works—from books to photographs to movies—must be treated 
exactly the same, especially with respect to duration. There is no 
such requirement under the Copyright Clause, and allowing authors 
to reclaim rights in certain kinds of works, such as books, may 
strengthen their position relative to commodifiers, like book 
publishers, while reassuring others, notably movie studios, that have 
tended to dictate the terms of copyright duration. By carrying out 
these changes in its approach to copyright, and duration in particular, 
Congress could restore balance to the three sides of the Copyright 
Triangle. Authors will lose few of the protections copyright was 
intended to bestow, commodifiers will maintain their rights to exploit 
different kinds of works for appropriate periods of time, and 
consumers will benefit from the passage of works into the public 
domain at rational, rather than arbitrary, junctures. Copyright can 
thus be modernized and rationalized with sensitivity to all players, 
providing for a more equilateral Copyright Triangle. 
 
 23. See, e.g., Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 18, at 11 (in which 
authors asserted that Google’s alleged copyright infringement depreciated the value of licensing 
and selling their books and caused “damage to their goodwill and reputation.”). 
COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE  10/19/2014 10:51 AM 
738 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:731 
II.  THE TROUBLED RECENT HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT DURATION 
Eldred and Golan both arose in the wake of the most recent 
revision of the Copyright Act, the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension 
Act of 1978 (CTEA), and both focused on copyright duration.24 For a 
variety of reasons, they perfectly illustrate both the tensions that exist 
within the Copyright Triangle and the fallacy that lengthening 
copyright duration is always the proper way to balance the 
competing interests of authors, consumers, and commodifiers. This 
Part demonstrates how CTEA, an ostensibly author-friendly 
Copyright Act revision, actually disserves authors in a variety of 
ways while serving the interests of commodifiers. The arguments 
around Eldred and Golan also show how the centuries-old theoretical 
underpinnings of the Copyright Clause, itself, came back to the fore 
through these debates. 
A.  Eldred v. Ashcroft 
Eldred v. Ashcroft arose as a direct result of Congress’s passage 
of CTEA, which extended copyright protection until seventy years 
after an author’s death, rather than the previous fifty years.25 By the 
time Eldred was decided, CTEA had become widely known as the 
“Mickey Mouse Protection Act,” both because the copyright 
extension it embodied forestalled the Disney cartoon character from 
entering the public domain in 2003 and because the Walt Disney Co. 
had supposedly lobbied members of Congress to support its 
passage.26 
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her majority opinion in Eldred, 
CTEA marked the fourth major extension of copyright duration since 
the Copyright Act of 1790 codified Congress’s “limited Times” 
power as a fourteen-year term, renewable once for an additional 
fourteen years.27 In extending copyright terms by twenty years, 
 
 24. Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). CTEA 
extended copyright durations, in most cases, to the life of the author plus 70 years, superseding a 
similar provision in the 1976 Copyright Act that had specified a duration of “life plus 50” years. 
Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 
2572 (1976). 
 25. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194–96. See also 17 U.S.C. § 302.  
 26. See Damien Cave, Mickey Mouse vs. The People, SALON (Feb. 21, 2002, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2002/02/21/web_copyright/ (discussing interview with co-petitioners Eric 
Eldred and Laura Bjorkland). 
 27. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194. The other three extensions came in 1831 (twenty-eight-year 
initial copyright term, renewable for fourteen years); 1909 (twenty-eight-year initial term, now 
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CTEA not only embraced a “life of the author plus 70 years” 
duration for new works, but extended the copyright term in 
anonymous and pseudonymous works to ninety-five years from the 
work’s initial publication or 120 years from its creation, whichever 
came first.28 
Eldred, the named co-plaintiff, had been offering public-domain 
works, such as novels by Nathaniel Hawthorne, free of charge on a 
website since 1995.29 He claimed standing on the basis that CTEA’s 
implementation would delay his web publication of certain works—
those that were about to enter the public domain when CTEA 
extended their copyrights—for twenty years, violating, he argued, 
not only the Copyright Clause but also the First Amendment.30 More 
expansively, he asserted that “[w]hile formally, under each of these 
extensions [of copyright, over time], the term is limited, the practice 
of continually extending copyright retroactively means that 
Congress, in effect, is granting copyright holders more than a 
‘limited term.’”31 
Eldred claimed that CTEA violated the Copyright Clause in two 
ways: by conferring additional copyright “benefits” on authors 
retroactively, which could not “promote the Progress of Science” 
(especially if the author were already dead), and by extending many 
copyrights to ninety-five years from the time of creation.32 This, he 
argued, was “beyond any reasonable expectation of the life 
expectancy of an author, since few authors begin creating works until 
they are at least adolescents and since there are few, if any, authors 
who have lived to an age exceeding 110 years.”33 He did not argue, 
however, against the validity of granting the “life plus 70 years” term 
to brand new works.34 
 
renewable for a further twenty-eight years); and 1976 (abandoning the “publication-plus” formula 
in favor of protection lasting, in most cases, until fifty years after the author’s death). Id. at  
194–95. 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1998). 
 29. Cave, supra note 26. 
 30. Complaint at para. 5, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 
1:99CV00065), 1999 WL 33743484. 
 31. Id. at para. 34. 
 32. Id. at para. 35. The ninety-five-year term was for works in which copyright already 
subsisted when the 1976 Act took effect. The corresponding term had been seventy-five years 
before CTEA extended it. Id. at para. 33. 
 33. Id. at para. 35 
 34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003). 
COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE  10/19/2014 10:51 AM 
740 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:731 
In effect, Eldred asserted that Congress had conferred a benefit 
upon authors, in the form of extended copyright duration, without 
asking for anything in return.35 Implicit in Eldred’s original 
complaint—and made more explicit by the time the case reached the 
Supreme Court—was the idea that the Framers had intended the 
Copyright Clause to demand a quid pro quo: Congress would grant 
authors copyright protection for a “limited Time” in exchange for 
their working to “promote the Progress of Science.”36 As Eldred’s 
brief noted, the first Congress had built this inherent “requirement of 
an exchange” into the Copyright Act of 1790.37 In fact, as Eldred 
noted, the Act had really foreseen two different sets of exchanges. 
One was Congress’s conferral of copyright protection on authors for 
limited times, in return for the author’s generation of “new 
production”: works that could benefit the public.38 Eldred’s 
complaint also described the second exchange Congress had foreseen 
in 1790: “In exchange for a new federal right, the author or 
proprietor would abandon his common law or state statutory right.”39 
The matter of this second exchange was an unusual one to raise 
in the late 1990s, but it had, indeed, been front and center when the 
Founders framed the Copyright Clause,40 and it gained new 
relevance in the context of modern authors’ rights. It had been 
enunciated both before and after the British Parliament’s adoption of 
the Statute of Anne in 1710, and it was still being debated when the 
foundational case in American copyright law, Wheaton v. Peters, 
 
 35. See Complaint, supra note 30, at para. 30–35. 
 36. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 11–12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618), 2002 WL 31039334. 
 37. Id. at 4–5. 
 38. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 903 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 39. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 36, at 5. 
 40. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 238 (James Madison) (Chicago, Scott, Foresman & Co. 
1898) (“The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of authors has been 
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law.”). But see Edward C. 
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a 
Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 33 (2003) (“[A]n argument could be—and indeed was—made 
that . . . the constitutional language was intended to protect existing property rights in both 
writings and invention. Read superficially and without reference to other contemporaneous views 
expressed by him, Madison's comments in The Federalist No. 43 could indeed be taken as 
supporting this view. But when the issue was presented to the Supreme Court in 1834 in Wheaton 
v. Peters, it chose to interpret the meaning given to ‘securing’ in quite a different light, namely, as 
merely a grant of authority to Congress to create a right.”). 
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reached the Supreme Court in 1834, seemingly settling the matter.41 
Now it was back before the Court. 
The “common law” right that authors, according to Eldred, had 
abandoned in exchange for “a new federal right” was the right to a 
perpetual copyright.42 But the Wheaton Court had dismissed the 
existence of such a perpetual right, emphasizing that when it passed 
the Copyright Act of 1790, Congress “instead of sanctioning an 
existing perpetual right in an author in his works, created the right 
secured for a limited time by the provisions of that law.”43 Moreover, 
Justice John McLean wrote, 
The word secure, as used in the [C]onstitution, could not 
mean the protection of an acknowledged legal right. It 
refers to inventors, as well as authors: and it had never been 
pretended by any one, either in this country or in England, 
that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to 
sell the thing invented.44 
Thus, according to the Wheaton Court, the Framers had no 
illusion that a common law copyright existed; it did not, and 
Congress in 1790 created a statutory copyright out of whole cloth.45 
Commentators have differed on the Framers’ real intent in 
imposing a “limited” duration on copyright. Melville and David 
Nimmer enunciate the dominant view that “the authorization to grant 
to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is predicated 
upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative 
activities of authors; and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary 
condition to the full realization of such creative activities.”46 Other 
 
 41. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Wheaton had claimed infringement of 
his copyright in his multivolume set of Supreme Court opinions, the precursor to modern 
reporters. Id. at 595. Peters, his competitor, denied any infringing activity and asserted that 
Wheaton had no copyright to begin with, because he had failed to comply with certain statutory 
formalities. Id. After losing the case, Wheaton lived to see the opinion published by his rival and 
opponent, Peters. Craig Joyce, "A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature": Wheaton v. 
Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 386 
(2005). 
 42. But see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 
(2012) & 3-9 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.09, n.11.2 (2012) (describing the exceptional—and 
exceedingly few—circumstances in which a vestige of common law copyright persists in the 
United States). 
 43. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 592. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2012). 
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scholars of copyright history, however, conclude that the Framers did 
not intend to use copyright as a spur to creativity, but rather to 
“vindicate any natural right the author may have to compensation for 
the product of his labor.”47 If so, then there was no logic to Eldred’s 
complaint that Congress should have demanded a new creative quid 
pro quo of authors before conferring longer copyright durations on 
existing works.48 Congress could determine the best way to “promote 
progress” however it saw fit.49 
Before petitioning for certiorari, Eldred had lost his case both at 
trial and on appeal, but the dissenting judge in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sounded a note 
of alarm that required an answer when Eldred arrived at the Supreme 
Court: 
[T]here is no apparent substantive distinction between 
permanent protection and permanently available authority 
to extend originally limited protection. The Congress that 
can extend the protection of an existing work from 100 
years to 120 years can extend that protection from 120 years 
to 140; and from 140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in 
effect can accomplish precisely what the majority admits it 
cannot do directly.50 
That is, if Congress could extend copyright in increments, and 
seemingly without limit, it could functionally restore the discredited 
idea of a perpetual copyright arising at common law. 
The response to that argument, according to the Eldred Court, 
was that prospective claims about what Congress might be up to 
were beside the point, and CTEA’s twenty-year extension of 
copyright was fully compliant with the Copyright Clause’s “limited 
Times” requirement.51 Moreover, the majority asserted, the 
durational expansion had been a “rational exercise” of congressional 
authority under the Copyright Clause, because Congress faced an 
urgent imperative: harmonizing U.S. copyright durations with those 
 
 47. Thomas Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 42 (2002). 
Nachbar argues that the “quid pro quo theory of copyright” is a modern construct contradicted by 
state copyright statutes, drafted at roughly the same time as the Constitution, that invoked authors 
“natural rights” as the true justification for copyright. Id. at 44. 
 48. See id. at 41–43. 
 49. Id. at 43. 
 50. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
 51. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003). 
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imposed under the Berne Convention and more recent European 
Union directives, which had set duration at life of the author plus 
seventy years.52 
But what of the other exchange implicit in copyright law: 
granting authors copyright protection in exchange for their creation 
of new work? The Eldred majority rejected the plaintiffs’ contention 
(as the Court characterized it) that such promotion had to be the sole 
objective of extending existing copyright terms.53 Instead, the 
majority reasoned that extending copyright durations by decades 
served the Copyright Clause’s goals by “spurring the creation and 
publication of new expression” as well as protecting the public’s 
access to “facts and ideas.”54 The bottom line was that longer 
copyright durations, such as those embodied in CTEA, “protect 
authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation.”55 
However, the Court offered no evidence for its reasoning that longer 
terms were compatible with the Copyright Clause’s goal of 
promoting “new expression.”56 
B.  Golan v. Holder 
Like Eldred, Golan v. Holder arose partly in the context of 
harmonizing United States law with the nation’s international treaty 
commitments. In Golan, a group of “orchestra conductors, educators, 
performers, film archivists, and motion picture distributors” sued the 
United States, claiming harm from United States adherence to the 
Uruguay Round of international trade agreements, which obligated 
the United States to place certain public domain works originally 
published outside the United States under copyright protection.57 The 
obligation arose when the United States signed the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 
1994.58 TRIPS had, for the first time, imposed penalties on signatory 
nations that failed to comply with Berne.59 Congress now saw no 
 
 52. Id. at 204–05. The original 1976 Act had accomplished harmonization with Berne’s “life 
plus 50” regime, but not with the subsequent EU extension of duration. Id. at 193. 
 53. Id. at 211–12. 
 54. Id. at 219–20. 
 55. Id. at 221. 
 56. Id. at 218–19. 
 57. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 12–13, Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976. 
 58. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878–81 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 881. 
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choice but to “restore” copyright protection to these works, and did 
so through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.60 
The Berne Convention had been the principal international 
treaty governing copyright relations since 1886, but the U.S. did not 
become a signatory until 1989.61 Previously, Congress had provided 
copyright protection to works first published abroad only when their 
countries of origin maintained reciprocal trade relations with the 
United States.62 When Congress finally ratified Berne in 1989, it 
initially ignored the Convention’s requirement that it extend 
copyright protection to all works that were still under copyright 
protections in their countries of origin.63 Consequently, works that 
were protected abroad—but which had never enjoyed copyright 
protection in the United States—remained in the public domain in 
the United States, leaving them available for free exploitation.64 In 
effect, TRIPS created an enforcement mechanism for Berne that 
Congress could not avoid. 
The Golan musicians and conductors claimed that their ability to 
publicly perform musical works would be impeded if sheet music 
previously in the public domain were suddenly placed under 
copyright protection and made subject to royalty payments.65 
Composers, similarly, asserted that works they had written to include 
selections of other composers’ works would be barred from public 
performance, since the underlying works—which had been in the 
public domain when the newer works were composed—would now 
be subject to copyright protection.66 For example, a high school band 
instructor who had composed a piece of music quoting selections 
from a symphony by Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich would 
 
 60. 18 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2004). Although 
copyright “restoration” became shorthand for placing works under copyright protection that had 
formerly been in the public domain, most were not being “restored” to U.S. copyright protection, 
never having enjoyed it previously. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882 & n.13. There were three reasons for 
the initial lack of protection: the U.S. and the origin country did not maintain reciprocal copyright 
relations at the time the work was published; the foreign creator did not follow U.S. copyright 
formalities in place at the time, such as placing a printed copyright notice in the work; or the work 
in question was a sound recording, a format that was not covered by U.S. copyright protections 
until 1972. Id. at 881–82. 
 61. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877. 
 62. Id. at 879. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 57, at 14. 
 66. Id. at 16. 
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be barred from publicly performing his own “derivative” work, 
because the Shostakovich selections were given copyright protection 
after the band instructor wrote his “derivative” work.67 Berne 
penalties or not, the Golan plaintiffs argued that Congress did not 
have the authority to remove works from the public domain, because 
the Copyright Clause applied protections only to newly created 
works.68 
A second argument focused squarely on the duration of 
copyright protections, asserting that CTEA’s “life plus 70” standard 
granted such a long period of copyright protection that it could not be 
considered a “limited Time” at all, as the Copyright Clause 
demanded.69 Under the Golan plaintiffs’ theory, Congress had not 
only removed works from the public domain but had placed them 
under “effectively perpetual” copyright protection, which it could 
extend again and again at will.70 
It was not an easy argument to make, as the Golan plaintiffs 
acknowledged, both because the governing law did specify a 
statutorily finite copyright term (albeit a very long one) and because 
the Court had seemingly foreclosed the “effectively perpetual” 
argument in Eldred.71 And, indeed, once again writing for the 
majority and referring to her earlier opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
rejected the “effectively perpetual” argument once more.72 The 
Copyright Clause, the Golan Court reasoned, did not preclude 
Congress from imposing a copyright term on works that had not 
fallen under copyright before, any more than it prohibited Congress 
from adding years to an existing copyright term.73 
Moreover, the majority observed, permitting Congress this kind 
of latitude did not suggest that it could one day create “perpetual” 
 
 67. Id. at 16. 
 68. Id. at 21. The appellants cited as authority Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(1966), which held that public domain inventions could not be placed under patent protection 
retroactively. The same rule that governed patents should apply to copyright, they argued, since 
Congress’s authority over both arose in the Copyright Clause. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra 
note 57, at 21. 
 69. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 57, at 22. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884–85 (2012). 
 73. Id. at 885. Viewed another way, the Golan petitioners had asserted, when a work lay in 
the public domain it essentially had a copyright term of “zero”; therefore, placing the work under 
CTEA’s copyright protection would effectively lengthen the term from zero years to seven 
decades or more. Id. 
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copyright protection, simply by extending copyright terms over and 
over.74 Yet the Court did not say why this “hypothetical” case was so 
far-fetched; instead, Justice Ginsburg chose to highlight the benefits 
of harmonizing U.S. copyright protections with those afforded by 
treaty partners.75 “In aligning the United States with other nations . . . 
and thereby according equitable treatment to once disfavored foreign 
authors,” she wrote, “Congress can hardly be charged with a design 
to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual copyrights.”76 
Yet, however admirable it was to align U.S. copyright 
protections with those of America’s Berne co-signatories, Congress 
had been moving steadily, if not “stealthily,” toward the vanishing 
point of “perpetual” protection for decades.77 Neither the majority 
opinion in Eldred nor its counterpart in Golan, moreover, stated just 
who would benefit from longer copyright terms, or how. While 
Eldred had nominally disfavored an early Internet information 
aggregator in the guise of allowing authors longer copyright terms it 
offered no clear evidence of how authors might benefit from CTEA’s 
durational extension.78 The Golan majority seemed to step back from 
the need for any incentive toward authors at all, endorsing the 
“dissemination” of works as a valid means of fulfilling the Copyright 
Clause mandate to “promote science.”79 No new “creation” was 
necessary.80 In effect, as Part III81 explores, those with the power to 
“disseminate” information were, for the first time, being placed on 
par with authors and the public as copyright’s intended beneficiaries. 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 875–76. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–95 (2003) (tracing the series of 
increases in copyright duration beginning with the Copyright Act of 1790 and concluding with 
the CTEA). Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, nonetheless reasoned that CTEA’s 
copyright terms, “though longer than the 1976 Act’s terms, are still limited, not perpetual.” Id. at 
186. 
 78. Id. at 187. 
 79. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See infra Part III. 
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III.  THE UNSUNG BENEFICIARIES OF LONGER COPYRIGHT DURATION 
A.  Enter the Commodifiers (Quietly): The Entertainment  
Industry as “Author” 
In some ways, Golan and Eldred were remarkable not for what 
they had to say about copyright duration, but for what they left out, 
such as who stood to benefit the most from extending copyright 
terms. But Justice Breyer, who dissented in both decisions, lost no 
time in identifying the real beneficiaries: 
The economic effect of this 20 year extension . . . is to make 
the copyright term not limited but virtually perpetual. Its 
primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to 
authors, but to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors. 
And most importantly, its practical effect is not to promote, 
but to inhibit, the progress of “Science” by which words the 
Framers meant learning or knowledge.82 
Justice Breyer suggested that focusing on America’s treaty 
obligations—or possible trade imbalances if Congress failed to 
match the European Union copyright terms—was a red herring.83 
“European and American copyright law have long coexisted despite 
important differences,” he observed.84 More than two decades had 
passed since the U.S. adjusted its copyright law to conform to 
Berne’s “life of the author plus” structure for computing copyright 
term.85 Europe’s adoption of the even longer “life plus seventy” 
standard did not require a like response; it was merely a matter of 
“European institutional considerations” following that continent’s 
consolidation.86 
Leaving treaty harmonization aside, Justice Breyer also rejected 
the majority’s alternate rationale for extending copyright durations: 
providing incentives “to those who act as publishers to republish and 
to redistribute older copyrighted works.”87 This justification could 
not be valid, Justice Breyer opined, because it ran counter to the 
Framers’ view that “it is the disappearance of the monopoly grant, 
not its perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote the dissemination 
 
 82. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 83. See id. at 259. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 260. 
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of works already in existence.”88 Far from serving the needs of 
authors or the public, CTEA’s extended durations seemed to serve 
only a “uniquely publisher-related rationale.”89 Congress’s attempt to 
provide incentives for the “dissemination” of existing work, rather 
than the creation of new work, was “constitutionally perverse.”90 
Justice Breyer found a more likely explanation for CTEA’s 
durational change in the Act’s legislative history, which “refers 
frequently to the financial assistance the statute will bring the 
entertainment industry, particularly through the promotion of 
exports.”91 At congressional committee hearings leading up to 
CTEA’s passage, corporate spokespeople and trade association 
executives—especially from the music and film industries—had 
testified to the need for copyright term extensions to maintain 
industry competitiveness abroad.92 Many invoked the need to protect 
authors’ livelihoods before turning to the industries’ own concerns; 
however, they refrained from going into great specifics about what 
authors could be expected to suffer without the durational changes: 
an old trope.93 
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s chairman, Sen. Orrin Hatch 
of Utah, opened the hearing of September 20, 1995 in typical 
fashion, declaring that Congress sought to bestow benefits on authors 
when, in reality, commodifiers were the proposed legislation’s main 
beneficiaries.94 “Our trading partners in Europe have recently 
established the goal to move the minimum copyright term . . . to life 
plus 70,” Hatch testified.95 “If we do not adopt the same rule, our 
creators will not reap the benefit of this new international 
standard.”96 Written works were property, Hatch told the committee, 
and he “[came] to the conclusion that, like most property owners, the 
vast majority of authors expect their copyrights to be a potentially 
valuable resource to be passed on to their children and through them 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 261. 
 90. Id. at 262. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. 
 93. See Christopher Ledford, The Dream that Never Dies: Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Author, 
and the Search for Perpetual Copyright, 84 OR. L. REV. 655, 656 (2005). 
 94. Senate Hearing, supra note 92 (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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to the succeeding generation.”97 But copyrights often expired “before 
even the first generation of an author’s heirs have fully benefited 
from them.”98 Particularly since Americans were enjoying longer life 
spans and marrying and having children later, Hatch continued, “life 
plus 50” copyright terms threatened to prematurely cut off the 
birthright of generations of authors’ offspring.99 Failing to lengthen 
copyright terms might also doom “perishable” works, such as old 
movies, to crumble rather than being preserved through 
digitization.100 Or, Hatch asserted, such films might have to be 
preserved at taxpayer expense, when lengthening copyright terms 
might allow “private parties” to fund preservation efforts, instead.101 
The next speaker, Register of Copyright Marybeth Peters, partly 
tempered Hatch’s prediction, admitting that it was “difficult to see 
how moving from a term of life-plus-50 to life-plus-70 will 
encourage authors to write.”102 Nonetheless, she agreed with Sen. 
Hatch’s assertion that “bringing our law into conformity with the 
longer copyright terms enjoyed by authors of other nations” would 
justify passage.103 
Authors, however, would not be the only or, necessarily, the 
primary beneficiaries of the proposed longer copyright duration. 
Christopher Ledford has observed that commodifiers have regularly 
claimed to be serving the rights and needs of authors when arguing 
for longer copyright durations that actually serve their own interests: 
When authors’ and media corporations’ interests diverge 
and one group’s position must yield, even on the rare 
occasion when the latter does not triumph, the media 
corporations’ interests are hardly dampened. Ultimately, the 
moments of authorial supremacy serve mainly to illustrate 
the manner in which perceived advances by authors are 
deflected or minimized while media interests acquire and 
retain tremendous benefits through their association with 
authors.104 
 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 3. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 6 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Ledford, supra note 93, at 660. 
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One of the hearing’s most prominent speakers spoke frankly 
about the real beneficiaries of copyright extension. After dismissing 
“the thickets of . . . arcane academic issues that float around this,” 
Motion Picture Association of America President Jack Valenti 
identified the reasons underlying his organization’s support for 
CTEA: “The copyright industries in this country—that includes 
computer software and music and books, television, movies, and 
home video—do about $45 billion a year abroad.”105 These 
industries, Valenti said, would be “at a distinct disadvantage” in 
competing with their European counterparts if the U.S. maintained 
shorter copyright terms than Europe.106 “The revenues that would 
come back to the American copyright owner now are truncated and 
are diverted into European and other hands,” Valenti told the 
senators.107 
Valenti’s written statement went even further in analyzing the 
supposed deleterious effects of shorter copyright terms. Valenti 
wrote that, contrary to the claims of academics—who argued that 
works enjoyed wider dissemination once they entered the public 
domain—“[w]hatever work is not owned is a work [in which no one 
would] invest the funds for enhancement because there is no longer 
an incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can 
offer for sale.”108 It was a curious argument, coming at a time when 
digitization was beginning to make the preservation of intellectual 
property all the more feasible.109 Taken as a whole, however, 
Valenti’s in-person testimony and written statement were notable for 
their focus on industries rather than on authors as the true 
beneficiaries of longer copyright terms. They also announced the 
conjoined interests of the other two parties to the Copyright Triangle: 
consumers and commodifiers.110 
 
 105. Senate Hearing, supra note 92, at 40 (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion 
Picture Association of America). 
 106. Id. at 41. 
 107. Id. at 40. 
 108. Id. at 42. 
 109. Cf. The Digital Age Promised Vast Libraries, but They Remain Incomplete, ECONOMIST, 
(Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21553410 (tracing the recent history of digital 
preservation efforts and the relative ease of preservation efforts in mechanical terms, but also 
highlighting significant remaining legal roadblocks to preservation). 
 110. Senate Hearing, supra note 92, at 42 (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion 
Picture Association of America). 
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The Congress can, without any harm to the consumers, 
magnify the revenue reach of copyright owners, and thereby 
help, perhaps modestly, but help nonetheless, in the 
reduction of our trade deficit . . . The Congress must equip 
American owners of intellectual property with a full 
measure of protection, else competition, in Europe 
particularly, becomes skewed and U.S. copyright owners 
are reduced in their reach and their effectiveness.111 
In movie industry terms, the import of “copyright owners” was clear: 
at least at the level of major motion pictures and network television 
broadcasts, the copyright “owner” was the studio, not the 
screenwriter, the director, or the author of the underlying book.112 
Justice Breyer, suspicious that the needs of authors were lost in 
such discussions, characterized this assertion of commodifiers’ 
competitive interests as a proper exercise of Congress’s commerce 
power rather than of its copyright power.113 And he again turned to 
the constitutional imperative to foster new creativity in authors—not 
the dissemination of older work by corporate grantees—when he 
addressed copyright duration in his dissent in Golan.114 Copyright 
was supposed to benefit “the writer who has not yet written a book, 
the musician who has not yet composed a song” by providing 
incentives for creative output, Justice Breyer wrote.115 “When a 
copyright law is primarily backward looking the risk is greater that 
Congress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense of 
badly organized unknown users who find it difficult to argue and 
present their case to Congress.”116 The same issues, Justice Breyer 
noted, had been at work when Parliament, attempting to rein in the 
“monopoly” control of the British book business by printer-
booksellers in the early 18th century, vested copyright in authors 
rather than publishers through the Statute of Anne.117 The 
“utilitarian” objective embodied in that statute and “embraced by 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984) 
(holding that the sale of home video recorders did not infringe copyrights in movies and 
television programs, which were held by two movie studios). 
 113. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 262 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 114. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 909 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 907. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 901. 
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Jefferson and Madison” was clear: authors’ rights in their work were 
not meant to be gratuitous but to “advance public welfare” and “elicit 
new creation.”118 Conferring new rights on movie studios, record 
labels, and other corporate interests by extending copyright 
protections on works that already existed did not benefit “authors” 
and might restrict the dissemination of intellectual property.119 These 
two results were the exact reverse of the Copyright Clause’s stated 
intentions. 
B.  The Triangle Evolves: The Information Industry  
Aligns with Consumers 
Though the movie industry and record labels claimed to speak 
for authors when they supported longer copyright terms in the 1976 
Act and CTEA, Justice Breyer observed that these terms did not 
benefit authors in most cases.120 In fact, Congressional Research 
Service statistics showed that “only about 2% of copyrights can be 
expected to retain commercial value at the end of 55 to 75 years.”121 
Justice Breyer already had ample experience with such figures. In a 
1970 article, in which he assessed early proposals to adopt the Berne 
Convention’s “life of the author plus 50” durational standard, he had 
concluded that only 1 percent of published works remained in print 
at the end of the then-prevailing fifty-six-year copyright term.122 
These figures suggested that authors stood little to gain 
financially from longer copyright terms. The same fact had been 
recognized decades earlier when Congress debated the 1909 
Copyright Act’s proposed extension of copyright renewal terms 
beyond fourteen years, or even adopting a “life plus thirty years” 
formula.123 In debates leading to the 1909 Act’s passage, Congress 
heard testimony that most authors never bothered to renew 
 
 118. Id. at 899–900 (internal citations omitted). 
 119. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254–63 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(providing reasons for the lack of support the Copyright Term Extension Act offers to authors and 
the general circulation of intellectual property). 
 120. Id. at 267–68. 
 121. Id. (citing EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-144 E, COPYRIGHT TERM 
EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES (1998)). Justice Breyer clarified that “retain 
commercial value” meant that the works would “still generate royalties after that time.” Id. at 
248. 
 122. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 324 (1970). 
 123. See H.R. REP. NO. 59-7083, at 13 (1907) (testimony of Rep. Frank D. Currier). 
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copyrights after the initial twenty-eight-year copyright period, which 
allowed 95 percent of works to pass into the public domain.124 As 
Breyer now pointed out, commodifiers—specifically the 
“entertainment industry”—might benefit from longer copyright terms 
even though authors would not, earning “higher corporate profits” by 
continuing to exploit rights that authors had granted to commodifiers 
years before.125 
Congress’s willingness to use copyright to serve the interests of 
commodifiers such as movie studios did not automatically 
disenfranchise authors. But the Court’s announcement that the 
Copyright Clause could be used purely to benefit the dissemination 
of existing works, rather than the creation of new ones, heralded a 
new aggrandizement of commodifiers at the potential expense of 
authors and the public.126 It also came just as a new cohort of 
commodifiers doing business on the Internet, and outside the 
traditional structures of the publishing and entertainment industries, 
began to assert their rights in ways that potentially damaged authors’ 
rights.  
These were entities such as Google that did not depend on 
creative works such as books and movies to generate their corporate 
profits, but were instead engaged in the movement of information 
and intellectual property from point to point.127 They thus did not 
depend on grants of rights by authors, such as those that authors had 
made to book publishers or that screenwriters had made to movie 
producers.128 Instead, they could serve as toll collectors in the 
information “superhighway,” earning revenues both from advertising 
and from the sale of information they accumulated about Internet 
users.129 Their primary stake was in having “information” available 
 
 124. Id. at 14. 
 125. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 262–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 126. See Stacy F. McDonald, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of Intellectual 
Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 HOW. L.J. 541, 544 
(2007) (arguing that “commodification of intellectual property distorts the copyright balance by 
valuing a copyrighted work for its market potential over, above, and to the exclusion of its non-
economic values”). 
 127. See Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 479, 480–83 (2011). 
 128. Id. at 481. 
 129. Id. at 508–10 (Google “makes the overwhelming majority of its revenues from search-
related advertising” but seeks additional revenue stream through the sale of scanned, searchable 
“snippets” of book texts and “non-display uses” of book contents). See also Hannibal Travis, 
Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. 
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to furnish to users; far from claiming to act on behalf of the 
information’s “creators” or publishers, in fact, Google claimed to 
provide access to information on an impartial basis.130 
These new commodifiers had arisen in an online environment 
that emphasized the democratizing power of the public domain and 
the idea, first articulated by the Internet pioneer Stewart Brand, that 
“information wants to be free.”131 By his own description, Brand’s 
original quote, offered at the first Hackers’ Conference, in 1984, was 
as follows: 
On the one hand information wants to be expensive, 
because it’s so valuable. The right information in the right 
place just changes your life. On the other hand, information 
wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting 
lower and lower all the time. So you have these two fighting 
against each other.132 
Brand offered a prescient revision of this statement three years 
later, foreshadowing the realignment of authors, consumers, and 
commodifiers that was to take place once the Internet became a 
fixture of household life: 
Information wants to be free. Information also wants to be 
expensive. Information wants to be free because it has 
become so cheap to distribute, copy, and recombine—too 
cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can be 
immeasurably valuable to the recipient. That tension will 
not go away. It leads to endless wrenching debate about 
price, copyright, “intellectual property,” [and] the moral 
rightness of casual distribution, because each round of new 
devices makes the tension worse, not better.133 
 
REV. 87, 92–93 (noting authors’ and publishers’ concern that Google intended “to sell advertising 
in connection with previews of copyrighted books”). 
 130. See Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://investor.google 
.com/corporate/faq.html (last visited July 7, 2013) (noting that the search engine’s primary focus 
is “on improving the ways people connect with information,” that “Google primarily generates 
revenue by delivering relevant, cost-effective online advertising,” and that “[w]e will do our best 
to provide the most relevant and useful search results possible, independent of financial 
incentives). 
 131. See Stewart Brand, Information Wants to be Free, STEWART BRAND, http://sb 
.longnow.org/SB_homepage/Info_free_story.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. At his website, Brand cites this version of his own statement to his book, THE MEDIA 
LAB (1987). 
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Once the Internet came into wide use by consumers, legal 
disputes involving this new means of disseminating copyrighted 
material were inevitable. The rise of file-sharing over the Internet 
also threatened traditional commodifiers such as movie studios, 
record labels, and book publishers.134 One of the first high-profile 
cases arose in the setting of the music industry.135 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.136 weighed whether a “peer-
to-peer” file-sharing service that allowed users to search, store, and 
share digital music files infringed copyright.137 After several record 
companies sued, Napster asserted in its defense that users’ copying 
and sharing of files constituted “fair use” under the Copyright Act 
for any of three reasons: because the sharing was temporary; because 
users were merely sharing files that they had already legally 
purchased; or because, in some cases, musical groups had consented 
to allow their songs to appear on Napster free of charge.138 The court, 
however, concluded that the fair use defense was inoperative where 
the plaintiff could prove “present or future market harm” and that 
both forms of harm were present.139 
Critics of Napster and a subsequent case finding infringement 
involving peer-to-peer networks, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. 
Grokster,140 have argued that such decisions gave too much control 
to content providers (record labels in Napster and movie studios in 
Grokster) and too little to the consumer-propelled market forces the 
Internet had unleashed.141 These cases did not represent the last word 
on the role of Internet-based commodifiers in facilitating the 
movement of copyrighted material to consumers without the 
payment of royalties to authors. Arguably, however, they did play a 
role in building consumer perceptions that web-based file-sharing 
sites, search engines, and similar services were allies in the “free” 
 
 134. See Ledford, supra note 93, at 674. 
 135. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1010–11. 
 138. See id. at 1014. 
 139. Id. at 1016–17. 
 140. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 141. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND 82 (2008) (“The Internet is safe now . . . because it developed so fast that it was a reality 
before people had time to be afraid of it. But it should give us pause that if we had our current 
guiding set of policy goals in place, our assumption that cheaper copying means we need greater 
regulation, we would never have allowed it to flourish.”). 
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movement of “information” and that traditional commodifiers and 
authors were the enemy.142 In this conception of the new digital 
landscape, book publishers, record labels, movie studios, and other 
traditional commodifiers, allied with authors, sought to “enclose” the 
information commons in ways reminiscent of late-feudal attitudes 
toward physical property and were arrayed against forces that sought 
the healthy expansion of the public domain.143 
It was in this continuing charged atmosphere that a federal court 
recently handed down a decision with potentially damaging effects 
for both book authors and traditional book publishers—and a 
concomitant liberating effect for online commodifiers of material in 
copyrighted books.144 The unexpected district court ruling in Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust145 concerned the right of a non-profit 
organization serving the blind to freely disseminate digital copies of 
ten million published works, even though seventy-three percent of 
them were under copyright protection.146 The principal defendant, 
HathiTrust Digital Library, planned to make the books available to 
the blind in such a way that they could easily be read, annotated, and 
navigated online.147 However, HathiTrust and five university-library 
co-defendants had also reached an agreement with Google that gave 
Google exclusive rights to make the books available for viewing by 
the general public (albeit in “snippets”) on its Google Books 
service.148 In return, the libraries received digital copies of each 
scanned work.149 A subset of “orphan” works—whose copyright 
 
 142. Ledford, supra note 93, at 674 (“The generational notion of entertainment or information 
as properly acquired for free is a major blow to the copyrighted industries. Thus, as distribution 
becomes less controllable, the focus on the author may in the long run prove to bite back at the 
corporations. If all legitimacy resides in the author, there is little reason to feel a moral obligation 
to pay the distributor.”). 
 143. See BOYLE, supra note 141, at 43–46 (arguing that a “second enclosure movement” 
seeks to wall off the “intellectual commons” in a fashion similar to the “enclosure” of private real 
estate in 15th to 19th century England). But see David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 144 (2009) for the contrasting view that “contrary to many commentators' 
claims, the biggest problem the public domain faces is not property-like rule structures in 
copyright law, but the lack of them.” 
 144. 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 448. 
 147. Id. at 449. 
 148. Id. at 448. 
 149. Id. The five libraries were those of the Universities of Michigan, California, Wisconsin, 
Indiana University, and Cornell University. Id. at 447. Indiana did not participate in the Orphan 
Works Project. Id. at 449. 
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owners are unknown—would be listed on a website for ninety 
days.150 If the owners failed to emerge after that time, those works 
would become available free of charge to HathiTrust’s users as well 
as to library users.151 
The Authors Guild, a membership organization representing 
U.S. authors, joined by its counterparts from Canada, Australia, 
Norway, and a separate group of individual plaintiffs, sued both 
HathiTrust and Google in separate actions.152 In their action against 
HathiTrust, plaintiffs alleged that the arrangements made between 
the two companies violated provisions of the Copyright Act 
governing exclusive reproduction rights of authors and copying by 
libraries.153 Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, an injunction barring 
HathiTrust and its co-defendants from providing the covered works 
to Google for digitization unless the copyright holders authorized 
such uses.154 The district court, however, granted HathiTrust’s 
motion for summary judgment.155 It held that the “Fair Use” doctrine 
provided a complete defense for the libraries.156 Significantly, the 
court found that the doctrine applied, in part, because the purpose 
and character of the use of the works—a key factor courts weigh in 
applying the fair-use defense to copyright infringement—was 
“transformative” in nature.157 “The use to which the works . . . are 
put is transformative,” the court reasoned, “because the copies serve 
an entirely different purpose than the original works: the purpose is 
superior search capabilities rather than actual access to copyrighted 
material.”158 Moreover, the judge concluded, the authors had failed 
to show that the libraries’ and Google’s scanning activities, and 
HathiTrust’s dissemination159—a factor that had been key in 
Napster—would damage authors’ ability to fully exploit their works, 
 
 150. Id. at 449. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 447; Author’s Guild Inc., v. Google, Inc. 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 153. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
 154. Id. at 449 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 (2002), 108 (2005)). The claim for injunctive relief 
did, however, carve out a limited exception for use by the libraries for non-commercial purposes. 
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 108). 
 155. Id. at 447. 
 156. Id. at 464. 
 157. Id. at 460. 
 158. Id. The court also found the use transformative on the separate ground that provision of 
the works to the blind was not among the works’ originally envisioned uses. Id. at 461. 
 159. Id. at 462–63. 
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including by licensing them.160 The HathiTrust court largely brushed 
aside the Ninth Circuit’s observation in Napster that “lack of harm to 
an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the 
right to develop alternative markets for the works.”161 Instead, it 
dismissed this possibility as “conjecture” and reasoned that use of the 
works in an existing, transformative fashion effectively immunized 
the defendants against claims of harm to future markets.162 
HathiTrust suddenly cast into doubt the outcome of the related 
class action lawsuit by authors against Google, again with the 
Authors Guild as lead plaintiff, which had dragged on without 
resolution since 2005.163 And it followed by only a month another 
ruling that seemed to spell defeat for authors and book publishers 
and victory for a major online commodifier: in this case, Amazon.164 
In United States v. Apple, Inc.,165 the United States Justice 
Department sued the technology company and the nation’s five 
largest book publishers, claiming that they had engaged in a  
price-fixing scheme to sell books via Apple’s iBookstore service.166 
In entering its final judgment against the publishers, the court 
required the five companies to terminate their pricing arrangements 
with Apple and to avoid, for two years, entering into any contract 
with an electronic book retailer in which the publisher asserted 
control over book pricing.167 Though ostensibly intended to break up 
an anti-competitive pricing arrangement, the Justice Department’s 
 
 160. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 161. Id.; HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 463. 
 162. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 463. 
 163. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). After granting 
initial approval to the settlement, the court reversed course—following three years of 
negotiations—on grounds it would “give Google a significant advantage over competitors, 
rewarding it for engaging in wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission.” Id. at 
669. 
 164. United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Authors Guild 
charged that the Department of Justice’s initial settlement with three of the publishers would 
restore a “status quo” that previously allowed Amazon to claim 90 percent of the online 
bookselling market through “predatory pricing.” Court Approves Justice Department’s E-Book 
Proposal, Restoring pre-2010 Status Quo Without an Economic Study, AUTHORS GUILD 
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.authorsguild.org/2012/09/. 
 165. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
 166. Id. at 627. All five publishers eventually settled with the government. Bob Van Voris, 
Apple Denies Conspiring with Publishers in E-Books Trial, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2013, 
9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-20/apple-denies-conspiring-with-publishers 
-in-e-books-trial.html. Apple announced that it would appeal the consent decree, and continued as 
the sole defendant. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 643. 
 167. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 629. 
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action was widely seen as benefiting the largest electronic 
bookseller, Amazon, and damaging publishers’ ability to assert 
control over development of the e-book market.168 The Authors 
Guild’s public statement on the settlement called attention to the 
weakened state of two traditional sets of commodifiers—the 
publishers themselves and “brick-and-mortar” bookstores—and the 
strength of Amazon, which represented the new type of commodifier 
that had originated in the digital environment.169 As a membership 
organization representing authors, the Guild’s concern was 
understandable: publishers might not always act in authors’ best 
interests, but at least the two parties’ interests were inextricably 
bound. Amazon, in contrast, had no direct relationship with authors 
and was looking out for Amazon alone. Once publishers and other 
traditional commodifiers ceded control of their side of the Copyright 
Triangle to entitles such as Google and Amazon, authors would exert 
even less control over their intellectual output—or even its value. 
The twin copyright-duration rulings in Eldred and Golan had 
confirmed the novel principle that one of the Copyright Clause’s 
primary goals was the “dissemination” of authored works—not 
necessarily with the additional goals of compensating authors for 
their creativity or expanding consumers’ access to cultural wealth. 
These rulings did not, however, anticipate the combined effect that 
lengthened copyright durations might have once Google and 
Amazon—and other commodifiers whose main business was 
dissemination—began to subsume the place of traditional content 
providers in the Copyright Triangle. Although Napster had failed to 
find a way to commodify copyrighted works without infringement, 
Google and Amazon appeared poised to succeed. A new set of 
commodifiers, born in an era of megabytes rather than printing 
presses, had allied themselves with consumers reared under the 
mantra of “Information Wants to be Free.”170 It remained to authors 
 
 168. See Dawn C. Chmielewski & Carolyn Kellog, E-book settlement has publishing world in 
turmoil, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/08/business/la-fi-ct-
ebooks-20120908. Jonathan Kirsch, a Los Angeles intellectual property attorney and author, told 
the newspaper that “[i]n terms of the real-life experiences of publishers, authors, and readers, this 
will represent a fundamental change in how books are published and sold.” Id. 
 169. See AUTHORS GUILD, supra note 164. 
 170. See Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where Does Creativity Come From? and Other 
Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 756–58 (2003) (explaining consumers’ 
discontent with the copyright system due to its complexity or because they object to the way 
“copyright industries have successfully commoditized culture”). 
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to see if there was still some way to adjust copyright protections to 
serve them in this new era. 
IV.  WHAT TO DO 
As discussed in Part III, the rise of Google and other digital 
information commodifiers did not occur because of changes in 
copyright law, such as CTEA’s extension of copyright terms. But 
their arrival did come about just as CTEA, confirmed by Eldred and 
Golan, made profound changes in copyright duration that benefited 
the older class of information commodifiers. Now that the newer 
class of commodifiers had arrived and found a willing audience of 
consumers who were happy to share books, songs, and movies in 
new ways (even if it meant infringing copyrights), traditional content 
providers, such as book publishers, found their interests potentially 
compromised, yet seemed unable to react except defensively.171 
HathiTrust and the Justice Department’s settlement with the book 
publishers in the Apple price-fixing litigation seemed to suggest the 
beginning of the end of the traditional structures these older 
companies had used to bring creative works to market. 
Although authors had always been uneasy allies with the 
companies that controlled their access to consumers,172 they had to 
wonder whether these imperfect but functional alliances could serve 
them much longer. And consumers, frustrated with traditional pricing 
structures for published works, found ways to get access to them for 
free.173 
No further adjustment to copyright duration could, alone, be 
expected to return market conditions to those that existed before the 
Internet redefined consumers’ access to information and intellectual 
property. But the Framers chose duration as the Copyright Clause’s 
principal mechanism.174 Therefore, it remains to be considered 
whether some new adjustments to duration, born in an era in which 
the printing press has given way to digital transmission, may better 
allow the Copyright Act to meet the Clause’s constitutional 
 
 171. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 24−25 (2009) (“The 
Internet has ended the ability of copyright owners to deny consumers their preferences, but rather 
than make money by satisfying them, copyright owners have resorted to litigation and 
technological locks to thwart them. Myopia appears to be, in their case, a congenital disease.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Madison, supra note 170, at 756−58. 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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imperative—whether that imperative is seen as fostering creativity, 
compensating authors, or building a flourishing public domain. 
This Part proposes two changes to copyright duration that may 
help authors to navigate this new landscape on their own, without 
concern for their traditional allies in the older content industries. One 
proposed change would strengthen authors’ ability to divorce their 
work from grantees, such as book publishers, to which they 
temporarily assign their rights. It would do this by revising the 1976 
Copyright Act to allow authors to reclaim their rights more quickly 
than is currently permitted by statute: thirty-five to forty years, 
depending on whether the grant includes publication rights.175 Thus 
the author would be able to enjoy the balance of the copyright term 
unencumbered by a grant he or she had earlier made to a book 
publisher or other corporate entity. The second proposal would be to 
return durations for certain kinds of works (notably books) to much 
shorter terms: perhaps periods very like the fourteen-year term, 
renewable once, that was enshrined in the original Copyright Act of 
1790.176 Though admittedly difficult to implement, both because 
copyright durations have consistently increased over time and 
because of harmonization of copyright laws under international 
regimes such as TRIPS, a reduction in copyright durations for certain 
kinds of works would meet the needs of the digital era, in which 
information may be disseminated rapidly, without printing presses 
and archaic distribution channels. The combined effect of these 
adjustments would be to keep creative works actively on sale rather 
than consigned to obscurity, benefiting the author for as long as he or 
she controlled the rights but benefiting the public by moving works 
into the public domain more quickly. 
A.  Reduce the Time Authors Must Wait to  
Recapture Their Rights 
For the first century and a half of American copyright law, 
authors who granted some or all of their rights to third parties—for 
 
 175. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)(2006). For grants of rights made after January 1, 1978, Congress 
specified that copyright owners could effect termination during a five-year window that began 
thirty-five years after the execution of the grant. In the case of publishing contracts, the 
termination clock began running thirty-five years after publication or forty years from execution 
of the grant, whichever was sooner. For works published prior to January 1, 1978, the termination 
provision, similar to that in § 203(a), appears in § 304(c). 
 176. 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
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example, book or sheet music publishers—were reasonably assured 
of being able to reclaim those rights in a timely fashion.177 The 
relative ease of reclamation came about through a structure that had 
always been part of the Copyright Act: the renewal term.178 Thus, for 
example, if an author in 1920 granted a book publisher the exclusive 
right to publish his or her novel, under provisions of the 1909 
Copyright Act, his or her successors retained the ability to reclaim 
the granted rights when it came time to renew the copyright after the 
initial twenty-eight-year term.179 This was because the author was the 
only party empowered to renew the copyright.180 
Even while renewal terms still existed, prior to passage of the 
1976 Copyright Act, book and music publishers found ways to 
circumvent the rights-reclamation process by having authors 
contractually grant their renewal rights to the publisher.181 Congress 
had considered but abandoned proposals to match copyright duration 
to Berne’s “life plus 50” regime as it framed the 1909 Copyright 
Act.182 It instead retained the renewal structure specifically in order 
to allow authors to reclaim their rights.183 “It not infrequently 
happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for 
a comparatively small sum,” the Committee on Patents told the 
House of Representatives.184 “If the work proves to be a great 
success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, . . . it should 
be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term.”185 
Despite this unambiguous expression of congressional intent, in 
1943 the Supreme Court unexpectedly interpreted the 1909 Act to 
allow authors to assign their renewal rights contractually.186 To 
 
 177. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law’s Inalienable 
Right to Terminate Transfers, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227, 227 (2010). 
 178. Id. at 228. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 227. 
 182. H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909). 
 183. Id. at 15–16. 
 184. Id. at 14. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Fred Fischer Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) (holding that the 
author of the song “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” had irrevocably transferred his renewal 
interest, not just his publishing rights, when he signed a publishing contract with a sheet music 
company). 
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prevent any future question that the renewal interest was inalienable, 
Congress made this an explicit provision of the 1976 Act.187 
However, the 1976 Act also fundamentally altered the 
mechanism for reclaiming rights by doing away with copyright 
renewal; after January 1, 1978, copyright in most works would be 
defined by a single term, equal to the life of the author plus fifty 
years.188 To allow authors to reclaim rights granted to third parties 
before the end of such a long period, Congress had to add a provision 
providing for reclamation.189 As early as 1961, the United States 
Copyright Office, already investigating revisions to the 1909 Act, 
had recommended that Congress adopt a blanket twenty-year 
limitation on copyright assignments as well as a provision allowing 
authors to terminate unremunerative grants.190 By the time the 1976 
Act was adopted, however, the automatic termination provision was 
gone (as was the ability to terminate on the basis of insufficient 
royalty income) and Congress had set the threshold for reclamation 
at thirty-five years.191 This provision was carried over when CTEA 
extended copyright durations by a further twenty years, despite 
recommendations by some copyright experts to allow authors and 
their heirs to reclaim their rights for the extension period.192 
As noted above, the grant termination provision (embodied in 
the 1976 Act and retained under CTEA) allows authors to terminate 
grants of rights thirty-five to forty years after the date of the grant.193 
That is too long. It was in the debates leading to passage of the 1976 
Act that Justice Breyer, then teaching at Harvard Law School, 
analyzed Congressional Research Service figures and found that only 
1 percent of published works remained in print after fifty-six 
years.194 There is little reason to suppose that many more works 
remain in print after thirty-five or forty years. The award-winning 
British novelist Julian Barnes recently asserted, “Nowadays, the 
 
 187. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177, at 228. 
 188. Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 
2541, 2572–73 (1976). 
 189. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177, at 229. 
 190. Id. at 228–29. 
 191. Id. Menell and Nimmer term the debates on this provision “quite spirited.” Id. 
 192. See, e.g., William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How 
Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661, 688 
(1996). 
 193. Id. at 685. 
 194. Breyer, supra note 122, at 324. 
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average shelf-life of a new hardback novel—assuming it can reach a 
shelf in the first place—is four months.”195 Judging by recent 
industry statistics, the time in which printed works become 
obsolescent is only accelerating. For example, recent U.S. book 
publishing industry statistics show that unit sales of printed and 
bound books declined 9 percent in 2012, on par with declines for 
each of the previous two years.196 It is clear that traditional 
publishing industry sales and marketing methods—tied to physical 
bookstores that are themselves in retreat—are no longer adequate to 
help authors reach consumers any more than traditional music stores 
are adequate to help composers and musicians market their own 
work. Yet in most book publishing contracts, authors grant 
publishers exclusive rights to publish in book and derivative forms 
“for the full term of copyright,” locking up a complete package of 
subsidiary rights (including paperback editions, electronic books, 
translations, excerpts, audio recordings, and in many cases, even 
television and film rights) for at least the full thirty-five years until 
termination becomes possible.197 The situation is similar in the music 
business where, traditionally, “very few corporations” acquire 
copyrights in songs from individual songwriters and musical groups, 
benefiting from authors’ inability to terminate grants they made in 
essentially unequal negotiations.198 
Some intellectual property scholars have suggested that, rather 
than allowing authors to terminate grants of rights more rapidly, 
Congress should consider new forms of regulation in author-
publisher contracts, since authors are in an inherently “weaker 
bargaining position.”199 That seems to miss the point. Empowering 
authors to reclaim rights in a more timely fashion will enable them to 
find new ways to exploit works that might otherwise lie fallow in 
publishers’ catalogs, years after most physical sales have taken place. 
 
 195. Julian Barnes, My Life as a Bibliophile, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2012, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/jun/29/my-life-as-bibliophile-julian-barnes. 
 196. Jim Milliot, Rate of Print Decline Flattened in 2012, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY 
(Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/article 
/55382-rate-of-print-decline-flattened-in-2012.html. 
 197. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 5-26 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 26.03 
(2012) (template for a “typical book publishing agreement”). 
 198. See Patry, supra note 192, at 662–63. 
 199. Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors": 
Anglo-American Authors' Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. 
Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1586–87 (2010). 
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Ultimately, authors, as creators of written, visual, and musical works 
and as individuals attempting to look after their own careers and 
reputations, have the greatest stake in making sure that their works 
reach the public and provide a healthy livelihood. In order to protect 
the value of agreements that book publishers, music labels, and other 
corporate entities entered with authors in good faith, a revised 
termination provision could and should resurrect the Copyright 
Office’s 1961 proposal: provide for the early termination of 
“unremunerative” grants.200 Copyright would remain in force but 
control would revert to the author. Congress could set financial or 
unit-sales criteria to help determine when a grantee had exhausted all 
likelihood of substantial further sales, triggering reclamation of 
rights by the author. Thus, even if copyright duration continued for 
the extremely long terms imposed by CTEA, authors would stand a 
chance of recovering and reinvigorating works grantees had long 
since stopped exploiting. They would also be in a position to police 
the exploitation of their rights in the online environment. 
B.  Apply Shorter, Not Longer, Copyright Terms  
to Certain Kinds of Works 
The Copyright Act of 1790 protected “the authors and 
proprietors” of maps, charts and books printed in the United 
States.201 With time, works in more media received protection, 
including engravings, etchings, and prints (1802) and musical 
compositions (1831).202 Congress protected photographs and their 
negatives in 1865.203 One impetus for passage of the 1909 Copyright 
Act was the then recent invention of the phonograph and the need “to 
protect the composer against the unlicensed use of his music in these 
mechanical instruments.”204 Just three years later, the invention of 
the motion picture required Congress to act again, adding movies to 
copyright protection.205 
 
 200. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177, at 229. 
 201. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 202. McDonald, supra note 126, at 547. 
 203. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012). 
 204. S. REP. NO. 59-6187, at 3 (1907). 
 205. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892. 
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Copyright duration, however, is uniform without reference to the 
medium of the work in question.206 That is true in the Copyright Act 
of 1976, as amended by CTEA in 1998,207 just as it was true in the 
Copyright Act of 1909.208 One reason for this uniformity may have 
been “the relative homogeneity of market conditions applicable to 
protected subject matter,” particularly when the Copyright Clause 
protected relatively few kinds of works.209 However, one has only to 
look to the legislative history of CTEA, and other recent adjustments 
to copyright statutes, to see that some media industries and 
intellectual property rights interest groups have greater lobbying 
capabilities than others.210 Indeed, it may have been inevitable that 
an industry responsible for “more than $4 billion in surplus balance 
of trade,” as the movie and television industry’s representative told 
the Senate committee considering CTEA in 1995, placed such a 
premium on extending copyright durations to match those in force in 
the European Union.211 
However, it is also the case that “innovators’ needs for 
intellectual property protection vary substantially across industries 
and among types of innovation.”212 Some experts in the economics 
of intellectual property reason that when rights are “more or less 
robust than necessary” to induce innovation, the resulting distortions, 
measured by interference with distribution, exact a “social cost.”213 
Such distortions may arise for reasons of both the scope and duration 
of rights, particularly when these factors are made uniform rather 
than tailored to “differences in functionality and expressiveness in 
patentable and copyrightable subject matter.”214 Copyright duration 
in the United States has always been uniform across all forms of 
intellectual property, even though the Copyright Act was initially 
 
 206. Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998) (“Copyright in a work created 
on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following 
subsections, endures for a term consisting of life of the author and 70 years after the author’s 
death.”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909). 
 209. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 846 (2006). 
 210. Senate Hearing, supra note 92 (in which, as noted earlier, testimony by the president of 
the Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, was arguably the most prominent). 
 211. Id. at 42 (Prepared Statement of Jack Valenti). 
 212. Carroll, supra note 209, at 847. 
 213. Id. at 849. 
 214. Id. at 862. 
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interpreted to apply to works in only a handful of media.215 Thus, 
there is a historical tradition for uniform duration; and, in recent 
years, U.S. adherence to international intellectual property regimes 
like Berne and TRIPS has confirmed the status quo attitude toward 
uniformity.216 In effect, the U.S. is now seemingly locked into a 
degree of durational uniformity imposed from beyond its borders, 
with relatively little discretion left to manage the attendant costs.217 
However, the United States could, and should, elect to lobby for 
change at an international level. The Berne Convention’s “life plus 
50” durational structure is virtually uniform across all works.218 
However, Berne was born in a European civil law context that had 
always emphasized the idea of “authors’ rights,” emphasizing the 
idea of creative works as an extension of the author’s intellect.219 
That is a fundamentally different conception of authorship than the 
utilitarian model, with its emphasis of tradeoffs between the author’s 
practical need to earn a living and the public’s need for a thriving 
public domain, which has predominated in the United States.220 
Arguably, the Internet’s arrival and its ability to disseminate works 
more quickly is reason enough to question the continued validity of 
the authors’ rights model as the basis for rigid conceptions of 
copyright duration. 
The public’s embrace of the “information wants to be free” 
model imperils the view that authors will always be perceived as the 
“good guys,” small-time artists who deserve to earn a living 
providing books, songs, photographs, and other works of creative 
expression for an adoring public. So long as authors are perceived as 
using copyright to “enclose” the information commons, Internet-
based information disseminators such as Google can be cast as 
intellectual Robin Hoods, liberating information that had selfishly 
 
 215. Id. at 846–47; see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) 
(noting that the Copyright Act of 1790 was initially interpreted to apply only to maps, charts, and 
books); and Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012) (providing dates when Congress 
extended copyright protection to additional categories of works). 
 216. Carroll, supra note 209, at 875. 
 217. Id. at 878. 
 218. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works arts. 3 & 7, July 24, 
1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. As Berne was originally framed, interestingly, 
photographs and “works of applied art” were exempted from the “life plus 50” rule, though a 
minimum term of twenty-five years applied. Id. art. 7. 
 219. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 57–58 (8th ed. 2010). 
 220. See Nachbar, supra note 47, at 39–40. 
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been guarded by greedy authors and their purported allies, the old-
style content providers (publishers, movie studios, record labels, and 
so forth) that stand to gain from reduced dissemination and increased 
prices. 
One way to combat this perception is to roll back copyright 
durational periods that impose social costs but can find no basis in 
financial reality for authors or even for content providers. At a time 
when information becomes obsolescent with astonishing speed and 
the public seems to adopt and overthrow “favorite” forms of 
entertainment with abandon, the case can be made that very few 
creative works have any business remaining under copyright for the 
life of the author plus seventy years or, for that matter, for terms 
even nearly approaching such lengthy durations. 
As Congress heard at hearings that preceded the 1909 Copyright 
Act—and as it heard again in the years leading up to the 1976 Act, 
including from the young Stephen Breyer—the vast majority of 
published works cease earning revenues for their authors within their 
first three decades of existence. If Julian Barnes is correct, most 
contemporary novels may achieve their entire shelf life within 
months of publication. Thus, copyright durations that served the 
nation in 1790 may once again be timely for certain kinds of 
works—especially books. Reducing durations to fourteen years, 
renewable once for fourteen years more, may be a perfectly sensible 
response to the new marketplace of ideas, where books and other 
creative works can be transmitted from creator to consumer in mere 
seconds, without need of printing presses, warehousing, physical 
shipment, and “brick-and-mortar” retail stores. However, Hollywood 
movies, which may take years and millions of dollars to develop and 
the resources of major motion picture studios and production 
companies to realize and exploit, may continue to require the “life 
plus 50” duration that Berne enshrined and CTEA extended. 
Now that the United States adheres to international treaties that 
impose long copyright durations and has ample reason to protect its 
intellectual property industries from retaliatory trade practices of 
other countries, it is constrained from imposing unilateral solutions 
to its own copyright dilemmas. But even if international regimes are 
cumbersome to negotiate, the transformation of technology demands 
replacement of Gutenberg-era copyright practices with customs and 
formalities that will serve a new age. The United States should begin 
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to set the stage for modernized and rationalized international regimes 
that will decouple creative works in each medium, and consider the 
scope and duration of protections that will best serve each one as 
well as the creators who depend on producing such works for their 
livelihoods and the consuming public. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Against the backdrop of the Internet, information and even art 
age more rapidly. No longer dependent on creaky distribution 
channels such as paper newspapers and magazines, printed and 
bound books sold in stores, and vinyl records sold in stores, works of 
authorship may travel to market far more quickly—but may also live 
out their lives much more rapidly. Now that consumers may read 
books, watch movies, and listen to music on their mobile phones as 
well as in their living rooms, it is easy to see how information moves 
at a faster pace than ever before. It is no longer sensible to imagine 
that information commodifiers can or should require decades to 
recoup their expenses in marketing and selling creative works that 
were, after all, the fruits of someone else’s labors. 
A more impressionistic rationale for copyright reform may be 
added to the substantive reasons for restoring authors’ control over 
their own work in the digital era: doing so might remind consumers 
that they have more in common with authors than with large 
commodifiers. If authors were decoupled from the media 
conglomerates that have controlled their creative output for so long, 
a generation of consumers raised under the “information wants to be 
free” ethic might think twice before downloading copyright-
protected works from the Internet without compensating the works’ 
creators. Reducing copyright durations—and allowing authors to 
reclaim their rights more quickly—might also allow authors to 
exploit their works more creatively, again fashioning a more 
productive and meaningful partnership between them and consumers. 
The result will be a more robust information commons, and a more 
rational, equilateral, Copyright Triangle. 
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